Libya and Iraq: The Price of Success

By George Friedman

In a week when the European crisis continued building, the White House chose publicly to focus on announcements about the end of wars. The death of Moammar Gadhafi was said to mark the end of the war in Libya, and excitement about a new democratic Libya abounded. Regarding Iraq, the White House transformed the refusal of the Iraqi government to permit U.S. troops to remain into a decision by Washington instead of an Iraqi rebuff.

Though in both cases there was an identical sense of “mission accomplished,” the matter was not nearly as clear-cut. The withdrawal from Iraq creates enormous strategic complexities rather than closure. While the complexities in Libya are real but hardly strategic, the two events share certain characteristics and are instructive.

Libya After Gadhafi

Let us begin with the lesser event, Gadhafi’s death. After seven months of NATO intervention, Gadhafi was killed. That it took so long for this to happen stands out, given that the intervention involved far more than airstrikes, including special operations forces on the ground targeting for airstrikes, training Libyan troops, managing logistics, overseeing communications, and both planning and at times organizing and leading the Libyan insurgents in battle.

Perhaps this length of time resulted from a strategy designed to minimize casualties at the cost of prolonging the war. Alternatively, that it took seven months to achieve this goal might reflect the extent of the insurgents’ division, poor training and incompetence. Whatever the reason, the more important question is what NATO thinks it has accomplished with Gadhafi’s death, as satisfying as that death might be.

The National Transitional Council (NTC), the umbrella organization crafted to contain the insurgents, is in no position to govern Libya by any ideology, let alone through constitutional democracy. Gadhafi and his supporters ruled Libya for 42 years; the only people in the NTC with any experience with government gained that experience as ministers or lesser officials in Gadhafi’s government. Some may have switched sides out of principle, but I suspect that most defected to save themselves. While the media has portrayed many of these ex-ministers as opponents of Gadhafi, anyone who served him was complicit in his crimes.

These individuals are the least likely to bring reform to Libya and the most likely to constitute the core of a new state, as they are the only Libyans who know what it means to govern. Around them is an array of tribes living in varying degrees of tension and hostility with each other and radical Islamists whose number and capabilities are unknown, but whose access to weapons can be assumed. It also is safe to assume that many of those weapons, of various types of lethality, will be on the black market in the region in short order, as they may already be.

Gadhafi did not rule for 42 years without substantial support, as the tenacity of those who fought on his behalf suggests. (The defense of Sirte could well be described as fanatical.) Gadhafi is dead, but not all of his supporters are. And there are other elements within the country who may not be Gadhafi supporters but are no less interested in resisting those who are now trying to take charge — and resisting anyone perceived to be backed by Western powers. As with the conquest of Baghdad in 2003, what was unanticipated — but should not have been — was that a variety of groups would resist the new leaders and wage guerrilla war.

Baghdad taught that overwhelming force must be brought to bear in any invasion such that all opposition is eliminated. Otherwise, opponents of foreign occupation — along with native elements with a grudge against other natives — are quite capable of creating chaos. When we look at the list of NTC members and try to imagine them cooperating with each other and when we consider the number of Gadhafi supporters who are now desperadoes with little to lose, the path to stable constitutional democracy runs either through NATO occupation (unofficial, of course) or through a period of intense chaos. The most likely course ahead is a NATO presence sufficient to enrage the Libyan people but insufficient to intimidate them.

And Libya is not a strategic country. It is neither large in population nor geographically pivotal. It does have oil, as everyone likes to point out, and that makes it appealing. But it is not clear that the presence of oil increases the tendency toward stability. When we look back on Iraq, an oil-rich country, oil simply became another contentious issue in a galaxy of contentious issues.

The Lesson of Baghdad

Regarding Libya, I have a sense of Baghdad in April 2003. U.S. President Barack Obama’s announcement of a complete U.S. withdrawal from Iraq gives us a sense of what lies at the end of the tunnel of the counterinsurgency. It must be understood that Obama did not want a total withdrawal. Until just a few weeks before the announcement, he was looking for ways to keep some troops in Iraq’s Kurdish region. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta went to Iraq wanting an agreement providing for a substantial number of U.S. troops in Iraq past the Dec. 31 deadline for withdrawal.

While the idea did appeal to some in Iraq, it ultimately failed. This is because the decision-making structure of the Iraqi government that emerged from U.S. occupation and the war is so fragmented it has failed even to craft a law on hydrocarbons, something critical to the future of Iraq. It was therefore in no position to reach consensus, or even a simple majority, over the question of a continued presence of foreign troops. Many Iraqis did want a U.S. presence, particularly those concerned about their fate once the United States leaves, such as the Kurds and Sunnis. The most important point is not that the Iraqis decided they did not want troops; it is that the Iraqi government was in the end too incoherent to reach any decision.

The strategic dimension to this is enormous. The Iranians have been developing their influence in Iraq since before 2003. They have not developed enough power to control Iraq outright. There are too many in Iraq, even among the Shia, who distrust Iranian power. Nevertheless, the Iranians have substantial influence — not enough to impose policies but enough to block any they strongly object to. The Iranians have a fundamental national security interest in a weak Iraq and in the withdrawal of American forces, and they had sufficient influence in Baghdad to ensure American requests to stay were turned down.

Measuring Iranian influence in Iraq is not easy to do. Much of it consists of influence and relationships that are not visible or are not used except in urgent matters. The United States, too, has developed a network of relationships in Iraq, as have the Saudis. But the United States is not particularly good at developing reliable grassroots supporters. The Iranians have done better because they are more familiar with the terrain and because the price for double-crossing the Iranians is much higher than that imposed by the United States. This gives the Iranians a more stable platform from which to operate. While the Saudis have tried to have it both ways by seeking to maintain influence without generating anti-Saudi feeling, the Iranian position has been more straightforward, albeit in a complex and devious way.

Let us consider what is at stake here: Iran has enough influence to shape some Iraqi policies. With the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. allies will have to accommodate themselves both to Iran and Iran’s supporters in the government because there is little other choice. The withdrawal thus does not create a stable balance of power; it creates a dynamic in which Iranian influence increases if the Iranians want it to — and they certainly want it to. Over time, the likelihood of Iraq needing to accommodate Iranian strategic interests is most likely. The possibility of Iraq becoming a puppet of Iran cannot be ruled out. And this has especially wide regional consequences given Syria.

The Role of Syria

Consider the Libyan contrast with Syria. Over the past months, the Syrian opposition has completely failed in bringing down the regime of President Bashar al Assad. Many of the reports received about Syria originate from anti-Assad elements outside of Syria who draw a picture of the impending collapse of the regime. This simply hasn’t happened, in large part because al Assad’s military is loyal and well organized and the opposition is poorly organized and weak. The opposition might have widespread support, but sentiment does not defeat tanks. Just as Gadhafi was on the verge of victory when NATO intervened, the Syrian regime does not appear close to collapse. It is hard to imagine NATO intervening in a country bordering Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon given the substantial risk of creating regional chaos. In contrast, Gadhafi was isolated politically and geographically.

Syria was close to Iran before the uprising. Iran has been the most supportive of the Syrian regime. If al Assad survives this crisis, his willingness to collaborate with Iran will only intensify. In Lebanon, Hezbollah — a group the Iranians have supported for decades — is a major force. Therefore, if the U.S. withdrawal in Iraq results in substantial Iranian influence in Iraq, and al Assad doesn’t fall, then the balance of power in the region completely shifts.

This will give rise to a contiguous arc of Iranian influence stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea running along Saudi Arabia’s northern border and along the length of Turkey’s southern border. Iranian influence also will impact Israel’s northern border directly for the first time. What the Saudis, Turks and Israelis will do about this is unclear. How the Iranians would exploit their position is equally unclear. Contrary to their reputation, they are very cautious in their overt operations, even if they take risks in their covert operations. Full military deployment through this region is unlikely for logistical reasons if nothing else. Still, the potential for such a deployment, and the reality of increasingly effective political influence regardless of military movement, is strategically significant. The fall of al Assad would create a firebreak for Iranian influence, though it could give rise to a Sunni Islamist regime.

The point here, of course, is that the decision to withdraw from Iraq and the inability to persuade the Iraqi government to let U.S. forces remain has the potential to change the balance of power in the region. Rather than closing the book on Iraq, it simply opens a new chapter in what was always the subtext of Iraq, namely Iranian power. The civil war in Iraq that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein had many dimensions, but its most strategically important one was the duel between the United States and Iran. The Obama administration hopes it can maintain U.S. influence in Iraq without the presence of U.S. troops. Given that U.S. influence with the presence of troops was always constrained, this is a comforting, though doubtful, theory for Washington to consume.

The Libyan crisis is not in such a high-stakes region, but the lesson of Iraq is useful. The NATO intervention has set the stage for a battle among groups that are not easily reconciled and that were held together by hostility to Gadhafi and then by NATO resources. If NATO simply leaves, chaos will ensue. If NATO gives aid, someone will have to protect the aid workers. If NATO sends troops, someone will attack them, and when they defend themselves, they will kill innocents. This is the nature of war. The idea of an immaculate war is fantasy. It is not that war is not at times necessary, but a war that is delusional is always harmful. The war in Iraq was delusional in many ways, and perhaps nowhere more than in the manner in which the United States left. That is being repeated in Libya, although with smaller stakes.

In the meantime, the influence of Iran will grow in Iraq, and now the question is Syria. Another NATO war in Syria is unlikely and would have unpredictable consequences. The survival of al Assad would create an unprecedented Iranian sphere of influence, while the fall of al Assad would open the door to regimes that could trigger an Israeli intervention.

World War II was nice in that it offered a clean end — unless, of course, you consider that the Cold War and the fear of impending nuclear war immediately succeeded it. Wars rarely end cleanly, but rather fester or set the stage for the next war. We can see that clearly in Iraq. The universal congratulations on the death of Moammar Gadhafi are as ominous as all victory celebrations are, because they ignore the critical question: Now what?
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111024-libya-and-iraq-price-success
Read more: Libya and Iraq: The Price of Success | STRATFOR

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Sanctioning Syria: The Long Road to Damascus

In 1996, an Israeli think tank, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, prepared “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” for incoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In that seminal report, the Richard Perle-led study group suggested that Israel could “shape its strategic environment, in cooperation with Turkey and Jordan, by weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria.” Comprised mainly of American-based pro-Israel advocates, the group stressed, “Most important, it is understandable that Israel has an interest supporting diplomatically, militarily and operationally Turkey’s and Jordan’s actions against Syria, such as securing tribal alliances with Arab tribes that cross into Syrian territory and are hostile to the Syrian ruling elite.”

Although Netanyahu didn’t act on their advice at the time, Perle and two of his co-authors, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser, found George W. Bush more receptive to “securing the realm” – for Israel – after September 11, 2001. Nine days after that “catastrophic and catalyzing event,” Perle signed a Project for a New American Century letter to President Bush, urging the United States to “consider appropriate measures of retaliation” against Iran and Syria if they didn’t “immediately cease all military, financial, and political support for Hezbollah” – whose presumably unforgivable crime was that it had “humiliated Israel by driving its army out of Lebanon.” Explaining the Bush administration’s subsequent decision to invade Iraq in 2003, Patrick Buchanan famously wrote in The American Conservative, “In the Perle-Feith-Wurmser strategy, Israel’s enemy remains Syria, but the road to Damascus runs through Baghdad.”

Notwithstanding Syria’s initial cooperation with the Israeli-inspired but American-fought “war on terror,” the Israel lobby ensured that there would be no long-term rapprochement between Washington and Damascus. A September 5, 2002 document, “Working to Secure Israel: The Pro-Israel Community’s Legislative Goals,” declared AIPAC’s intention to “sanction Syria for its continuing support of terrorism” by working “with Congress to pass the Syria Accountability Act.”

In October 2003, Representative Eliot Engel, who sponsored the legislation,proudly reported the bill’s imminent passage to the inaugural Jerusalem Summit, organized by Ariel Sharon’s government and its diehard American supporters (including the ubiquitous Perle) “to work out a joint strategy of resistance to the Totalitarianism of the Radical Islam, and to the moral relativism which in vain tries to placate this Totalitarianism by sacrificing Israel.” Confusing the ultimate target of the AIPAC-crafted legislation with Israel’s more southerly bête noire, the Jewish Democrat from New York informed the summit, “It’s no secret that the people on Lebanon’s southern border, the terrorists, Hamas, are wrecking [sic] havoc and causing all kinds of destruction and could be stopped tomorrow if Syria wanted it. This is Hamas, the group which blew up over 200 US marines. This is the group that goes out not only to destroy Israel, but would destroy the United States as well.”

With Iraq proving to be less of a “cakewalk” than America’s pro-Israel warmongers had breezily predicted, Syria managed to survive two Bush terms. The failure of Israel’s 2006 invasion of Lebanon to dislodge Hezbollah, however, added significantly to the impetus for regime change in Damascus. When Israel’s friends in Washington concluded that the Syrian corridor to Iran was “Hezbollah’s Achilles heel,” Bashar al-Assad’s days were increasingly numbered. The Arab uprisings of 2011 provided them with their long-sought opportunity for “rolling back Syria.”

Writing in the Guardian, Alistair Crooke describes how the “great game” of “losing Syria” is currently being played out with the cooperation of the absolute monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar; the also predominantly Sunni secular Republic of Turkey; and France, arch-promoters of Libya’s NATO-backed “revolution” and Syria’s short-lived former colonial rulers, i.e. “set up a hurried transitional council as sole representative of the Syrian people, irrespective of whether it has any real legs inside Syria; feed in armed insurgents from neighbouring states; impose sanctions that will hurt the middle classes; mount a media campaign to denigrate any Syrian efforts at reform; try to instigate divisions within the army and the elite; and ultimately President Assad will fall.”

Enforcing those AIPAC-endorsed sanctions has been the happy task of the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Created in early 2004 after intensive lobbying by AIPAC and its associated think tank, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the TFI unit has been aptly described as “a sharp-edged tool forged principally to serve the Israel lobby.” With David S. Cohen succeeding Stuart Levey as Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence in January 2011, a leading journalist on the Middle East was later prompted to call the position “a job which seems reserved for pro-Israeli neo-cons to wage economic warfare against Tehran.”

In recent days, Cohen’s TFI unit has been eagerly waging economic warfareagainst Damascus. Daniel L. Glaser, the Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, has just completed a tour of Lebanon and Jordan to secure their compliance with economic sanctions against the Assad government. In Beirut, the U.S. Embassy announced that Glaser was pressing the authorities to “remain vigilant against attempts by the Syrian regime to evade U.S. and EU sanctions.”

In a recent policy alert, WINEP’s executive director, Robert Satloff, urged that “with the strategic opportunity of contributing to the demise of Iran’s premier Arab ally, Washington should be working overtime to act in defense of the Syrian people.” Considering the long road to Damascus pursued by Satloff’s fellow-travellers, it should be clear for which country regime change in Syria presents a “strategic opportunity.”

Maidhc Ó Cathail writes extensively on U.S. foreign policy and the Middle East. Read other articles by Maidhc, or visit Maidhc’s website.

http://dissidentvoice.org/2011/11/sanctioning-syria-the-long-road-to-damascus/

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Here are America’s Iran Options. Action Must be Taken Now

By Clifford D. May

http://www.JewishWorldReview.com | .

The report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency last week confirms that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will soon have their fingers on nuclear triggers — unless serious actions are taken. “The biggest threat to the United States,” a senior U.S. military official toldreporters, “has come into focus and it’s Iran.”

You think? Thirty-two years ago this month, Iranian revolutionaries committed their first act of war against America: storming our embassy in Tehran and taking 52 diplomats hostage. Four years later, the regime deployed Hezbollah, its terrorist foreign legion, to slaughter 258 American Marines and diplomats in Beirut. In 1996, the FBI believes, the ayatollahs ordered the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. airmen. Tehran has supported militias in Iraq that have killed hundreds of American soldiers. It has provided assistance to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Iran’s rulers have vowed that “a world without American . . . is attainable,” and “Death to America!” has for years been scrawled on Iranian missiles. Last month, law enforcement authorities revealed details of an Iranian plot to blow up a restaurant in Washington, D.C.

All this and more the theocrats managed while Iran has been militarily weak. Imagine what they will do once they are packing nuclear heat.

Imagine this, too: Iran goes nuclear — despite American presidents, Republican and Democratic alike, vowing that such an outcome would be “unacceptable.” Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and other nations in the Middle East move quickly to acquire their own nukes. Over the years that follow, what do you think are the chances that one of those weapons winds up in the hands of “stateless” terrorists? Other countries will cut deals with Tehran — at America’s expense. The likelihood of a confrontation, sooner or later, between the nuclear-armed, oil-rich, global-revolutionary Islamic Republic and the “Great Satan” will rise. Or, also plausible, Americans will gradually submit to a new world order, one in which tyrants set the rules and everyone else abides by them.

The policy options available to President Obama, leaders in Congress and those running for election next year are not numerous. A quick review of what is currently on the table:

Diplomacy, outreach, and engagement: During his earliest days in office, President Obama famously told Iran’s rulers that if they will “unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us.” Their fist remains firmly clenched. Anti-Americanism is a central pillar of Khomeinism, the regime’s murderous utopian ideology. What we have not done: engage with the Iranian opposition. Dissidents would benefit enormously from receiving America’s moral support openly and America’s material support covertly.

Sanctions: Passed by Congress on a broadly bipartisan basis, sanctions have cost Tehran tens of billions of dollars. This has weakened the regime — but not nearly enough. “Crippling” sanctions have been threatened but not implemented. On Tuesday, my Foundation for Defense of Democracies colleague, Mark Dubowitz, testified before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations on tougher and more creative approaches that could dramatically reduce Iran’s oil income — from which the regime derives 80 percent of its hard-currency export earnings — without roiling oil markets or further upsetting the global economy. These approaches would not require Russia or China to go along — because they will not.

Cyber warfare and covert action: Iran’s nuclear-weapons program has been delayed by the Stuxnet worm and the untimely deaths of a number of scientists. Can more be done, quickly, along these lines? Those who know are not talking and those who talk don’t know. What we do know: It is essential for the U.S. to establish and maintain a qualitative lead in both offensive and defensive cyber weapons, and to develop highly sophisticated clandestine capabilities.

U.S. military force: A last resort, after all peaceful efforts have been exhausted, would probably feature an aerial campaign to destroy or degrade Iran’s nuclear facilities — with no boots on the ground. The risks and uncertainties of such action should not be minimized. By the same token, standing up to Khamenei and Ahmadinejad will not be easier once they possess a nuclear arsenal. (In conversations with his generals, Hitler marveled that the West had not challenged him when he was weak and the costs would have been modest, but instead waited until he was strong and the costs catastrophic.)

Lead from behind: Geographically and theologically, Israel is on the front lines of the War Against the West. Though stopping Iran from establishing a new, anti-Western empire should not be the responsibility of Israelis alone, they may decide they cannot wait for the rest of the world to realize the folly of repeating the mistakes of the 1930s. The “Little Satan” does not have the military might of the United States but never underestimate the ingenuity and determination of this tiny state with its back against the wall. The U.S. might as well provide assistance. America’s enemies and the conspiracy theorists — those who blame the CIA and the Mossad for 9/11 — will point fingers at Washington in any case.

Containment: There are those who argue that Iran can’t be stopped from acquiring nuclear weapons or that whatever attempts are made will prove counterproductive. But, they add, not to worry: If a nuclear-armed Soviet Union could be contained for 40 years, so can a nuclear-armed Iran. Soviet atheists, however, though evil, were generally rational and saw little prospect of rewards in the Hereafter. Ahmadinejad and Khamenei may actually believe that an apocalyptical war is necessary to summon the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi, the Savior. If so, for them, as scholar Bernard Lewis has said, “mutually assured destruction is not a deterrent; it is an inducement.” In any case, a serious containment policy would have to include comprehensive missile defense so that we could say to Iran’s rulers: “We have the means to prevent any nuclear-armed missiles you fire from reaching their intended victims.” In fact, though we have the technology to build such a missile shield, we are not doing it.

Appease, temporize, posture, and gesture: That’s a fair description of both American and European policy toward Iran over the past three decades. It’s taken a very long time for the Iranian threat to come into focus for many of America’s leaders. And it’s still not certain that they will respond, seriously and effectively, to this clear and present danger.

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Sources expects Israeli attack on Iran with US logistical support early 2012!

A senior Foreign Office official says British governmentministers have been told to expect Israeli military action in the wake of the UN watchdog report “as early asChristmas or very early in the new year,” the London Daily Mail reported Thursday, Nov. 10.  The ministers were told that Israel would strike Iran’s nuclear sites “sooner rather than later” – with “logistical support” from the US.

According to the British paper, which has good military and intelligence ties in London, President Barack Obama would “have to support the Israelis or risk losing Jewish-American support in the next presidential election.” The bigger concern is that once Iran is nuclear-armed, it will be impossible to stop Saudi Arabia and Turkey from developing their own weapons to even out the balance of nuclear terror in the Middle East.

debkafile’s military sources add that Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has told Obama more than once this year, “If Iran gets nuclear arms, Turkey will get nuclear arms.”

The Daily Mail goes on to report that in recent weeks, British Ministry of Defense sources confirmed that contingency plans had been drawn up in the event that the UK decided to support military action.
debkafile refers to an earlier report that the British chief of staff, Gen. Sir David Richards, paid a secret visit to Israel on Nov. 2, followed the next day by the arrival in London of the Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak for talks with British defense and military heads.
The reference to US logistical support is explained by our military sources as pointing to the Libyan model of military intervention whereby France, Britain and Italy spearheaded the action against the Qaddafi regime while the United Statesfrom “a back seat” laid on satellite and aerial intelligence and placed at their disposal its logistical supply network, including the in-flight refueling of bombers and ordnance.
Transposing this model to an offensive against Iran, Israel’s air and naval forces would front the attack on Iran with logistical and intelligence backup from the United States, while leading NATO powers France, Britain,Germany, Holland and Italy would participate directly or indirectly in the Israeli operation.
Since this attack would almost certainly bring forth reprisals from Tehran and its allies, Syria, Hizballah and the Palestinian Hamas and Jihad Islami, it would almost certainly expand into a wider Middle East conflict, thus also broadening US and West European military intervention.

Prospects are fading for the alternative to military action – tough new sanctions able to choke Iran’s financial operations and oil exports after the nuclear agency confirmed its surreptitious attainment of a nuclear weaponcapability.

Wednesday, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov promised visiting Iranian official Ali Baqeri that “Any additional sanctions against Iran will be seen… as an instrument for regime change in Tehran. That approach is unacceptable to us and the Russian side does not intend to consider such proposals.”

China will certainly go along with Russia on this.

Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s first response to the IAEA report was to attack its credibility and declare that Iran would continue its nuclear program regardless of its findings.

 http://www.pakalertpress.com/2011/11/17/sources-expects-israeli-attack-on-iran-with-us-logistical-support-early-2012/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+pakalert+%28Pak+Alert+Press%29

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Iran Keeps Velvet Glove On Its Iron Fist After Israeli Sucker Punch

On Thursday, November 10, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned the United States and Israel against attacking Iran,saying:

„Anybody who takes up the idea of an attack on Iran, should get ready to receive a strong slap and an iron fist.”

Two days after Khamenei made those remarks, Israel and the shadow government in the United States tested Iran’s mettle.

On Saturday, November 12, Israel teamed up with the MEK, a notorious terrorist cult that has killed numerous CIA agents and Iranian officials in the past, to kill nearly 17 Iranian Revolutionary Guard soldiers at an Iranian military base near Tehran. Among the dead was the founder of the country’s missile defense, Maj. Gen. Hassan Moghaddam.At a funeral held on Monday for the Martyrs who died in the attack, Tehran’s mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf sang Moghaddam’s praises and acknowledged that he was killed by Iran’s enemies, saying:

„Martyr Moghadam was unknown in the Revolutionary Guard. Our enemies knew him better than our friends. He is irreplaceable.”

The mayor’s emotional speech diverted from the official line of the Iranian government, which is calling the Israeli attack an „accident.”

Nobody would like to see Iran respond with irrational passion and blind anger more than Israel. So Iranian leaders are following a smart and sensible strategy at this time. Revenge can wait for now.

Attacking Israel would play into its hands, since it badly wants a war with Iran to divert domestic attention from the Israeli social justice movement and international attention from the Palestinian diplomatic struggle that has already claimed major victories on the international stage.

The journalist/blogger Richard Silverstein originally broke the story that the Mossad and the MEK attacked Iran on Saturday. In an interview with Scott Horton of Antiwar.com on November 15, Silverstein said that this latest act of Israeli aggression against Iran is part of a longer „black ops program” that Israel is using against Iran.

Silverstein told Horton:

„There is a two-pronged strategy that Israel and the U.S. is following with regards to Iran. One track might be a direct military attack on Iran to try to take out their nuclear facilities. And the alternate approach is this black ops program which has involved major acts of terror at missile bases.

This was the second major explosion at a missile base. There was one a year ago that killed eighteen Iranian Revolutionary Guard soldiers. There was at least three assassinations of nuclear scientists in and around Tehran. And an IRG military transport plane was dropped out of the sky a couple of years ago. And Israeli reporters who follow the security beat in Israel have reported that all of those were acts that the Mossad and the MEK had some hand in.

So there seems to be this approach in Israel that if we don’t want to do a full head-on military attack then we’ll try this black ops approach and see if we can delay the Iranians and take out some of their key brains in the nuclear program.

And my take on this is that neither approach is going to work. The black ops approach to me is a substitute for having a real policy towards Iran, and it’s not going to stop Iran from getting a nuclear bomb, if that is what they do want to do. The only way to really address the Iranian nuclear threat, if you want to call it that, is by negotiation between all the parties involved. And that’s something that neither side seems to be interested in, so it just turns out to be a huge mess really.”

Israel could be using covert methods either in preparation for a full frontal military attack on Iran in the near future, or as an alternative to an all out war.

My best guess is that Israel is trying to make Iran as weak as possible before going ahead with an attack on its nuclear facilities, but this strategy is short-sighted and it will backfire.

What this attack achieved in doing is angering the Iranian leadership and people, and making them more united against Israel.

By killing an Iranian hero in the hopes of derailing Iran’s defenses, Israel is bringing death and misery upon itself. That is something I do not wish upon any nation. But that is what will happen if Israel does not abandon its self-destructive course.

The saddest thing in this grand tragedy is that it seems Israeli leaders want to see the destruction of Israel more than Iranian leaders. Their policies towards Iran and the international community are based on terrorism, deception, fraud, paranoia, hatred, and irrational hostility.

Hopefully the Israeli people will stop their deranged and criminal leaders from committing Israel to a total and reckless war with Iran. If they don’t, they will be ruined and desolated, and their legacy will be one of shame and disgrace.

http://disquietreservations.blogspot.com/2011/11/iran-keeps-velvet-glove-on-its-iron.html

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